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THE PREEMPTION OF STATE
HAZARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE
REGULATIONS: THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE AWAKENS
ONCE MORE
MICHAEL P. HEALY*
Last term, for the first time since its watershed decision in Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, I the Supreme Court considered the extent to which
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution2 constrains a
state's ability to regulate the disposal of hazardous and solid waste
within its borders. In two cases, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Hunt 3 and Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc v. Michigan Department
of Natural Resources,4 the Supreme Court acted to limit substantially
states' ability to respond independently to the crisis of solid and haz-
* Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1978,
Williams College; J.D. 1984, University of Pennsylvania. The author thanks the
University of Kentucky College of Law for the summer research grant that supported
research for this Article. The author thanks John H. Garvey for reviewing and
commenting upon a draft of this Article.
1. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Two members of the Court, Chief Justice Burger and then-
Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the Court's decision.
2. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have
Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
4. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
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ardous waste disposal.'
The first three parts of this Article summarize and critique each of
these decisions. The Article describes the harmful impact of the
Court's application of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in cases in-
volving state waste regulation. The final part of the Article surveys the
options available for states wishing to limit in-state disposal of out-of-
state waste.
I. CHEMICAL WASTE MANAGEMENT AND THE STRONG RULE
AGAINST PROTECTIONIST STATE REGULATION
A. A Summary of the Decision
In Chemical Waste Management,6 Justice White, writing for eight
members of the Court,7 struck down an Alabama statute which im-
posed an "additional fee" on the operator of the Emelle, Alabama com-
mercial hazardous waste disposal facility. The surcharge applied to
each ton of hazardous waste "generated outside of Alabama" and dis-
posed of at the facility.' Chemical Waste Management, the owner and
operator of the Emelle facility,9 challenged the constitutionality of the
additional fee as applied to out-of-state waste.10 The additional fee
comprised a critical component of Alabama's effort to regulate the
5. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,980 (1991) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) (decrying the current "municipal solid waste crisis"
and "[t]oday's disposal capacity crisis").
6. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
7. Chief Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter from the Court's opinion. See id.
at 2017-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2012; ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(b) (1990 & Supp. 1992).
The additional fee was $72.00 for each ton of hazardous or solid waste. ALA. CODE
§ 22-30B-2(b). The additional fee comprised only one of three parts of a statute that
regulated the disposal of waste at the Emelle facility. See id. §§ 22-30B-1 to 22-30B-18.
The law imposed a cap on the total amount of hazardous waste and substances which a
facility could receive for disposal during any one-year period. Id. § 22-30B-2.3. The
code defined the cap as the amount of hazardous waste disposed of during the first year
the fees established by the statute were in effect. The law also established a "base fee" of
$25.60 to be paid by the facility operator for every ton of hazardous waste disposed of at
the facility. Id. § 22-30B-2(a). The Supreme Court did not review either of these other
statutory provisions. See 112 S. Ct. at 2012 (stating that the grant of certiorari was
"limited to petitioner's Commerce Clause challenge to the additional fee.").
9. 112 S. Ct. at 2011.
10. Id. at 2012. Chemical Waste Management brought its action in state court
challenging each of the three requirements the Alabama statute imposed on the Emelle
facility. Id. See also ALA. CODE §§ 22-30B-2 to 22-30B-2.3 for a full description of the
constraints state law imposed on the Emelle facility. The state trial court upheld the
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large amounts of out-of-state waste deposited at the Emelle facility.1 1
The Court's rejection of Alabama's additional fee for the disposal of
out-of-state waste is significant for two reasons. First, consistent with
its earlier decision in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, where the Court con-
cluded that "the interstate movement of... waste" is subject to Com-
merce Clause protection, 12 the Chemical Waste Management Court
indicated that, because hazardous waste "is simply a grade of solid
waste, albeit one of particularly noxious and dangerous propensities,"
it is an article of commerce. The Court's characterization of the waste
as an article of commerce subjects it to the Commerce Clause.1
Chemical Waste Management is also significant because it superfi-
cially applies the virtually per se rule of invalidity to state regulations
which discriminate against out-of-state commerce. The invalidation of
cap and base fee provisions, but struck down the additional fee as a violation of the
Commerce Clause. 112 S. Ct. at 2012.
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the cap and base fee
were valid, and reversed the trial court's decision that the additional fee was unconstitu-
tional. Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So.2d 1367, 1390 (Ala. 1991),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992). The court held that "[tihe Additional Fee provision in the
Act advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives. It has not been enacted for the purpose of economic
protectionism." Id. at 1388.
11. The Emelle facility receives hazardous waste from 48 states and occupies 2730
acres of land. State of Alabama ex rel. Siegelnan v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 501 (11th Cir.
1990).
The lack of hazardous waste disposal facilities and the relative importance of the
Emelle facility in providing for disposal of the Nation's hazardous waste are apparent in
the Supreme Court's statement of the facts: "Alabama is 1 of only 16 States that have
commercial hazardous waste landfills, and the Emelle facility is the largest of the 21
landfills of this kind located in these 16 States." Chemical Waste Management, 112 S.
Ct. at 2011. Moreover, "up to 90% of the [waste] tonnage permanently buried [at
Emelle] each year is shipped in from other States." Id. at 2012.
12. 437 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1978).
13. 112 S. Ct. at 2012 n.3. The decision that hazardous waste is an article of com-
merce is consistent with the Court's decision in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michi-
gan Dep't of Natural Resources, which reached the same conclusion regarding solid
waste. 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2023 (1992). In Fort Gratiot Landfill the Court found:
[W]hether the business arrangements between out-of-state generators of waste and
the Michigan operator of a waste disposal site are viewed as 'sales' of garbage or
'purchases' of transportation and disposal services, the commercial transactions
unquestionably have an interstate character. The Commerce Clause thus imposes
some constraints on Michigan's ability to regulate these transactions.
Id. See also New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419-20 (1992) ("Space in
radioactive disposal sites is frequently sold by residents of one State to residents of an-
other. Regulation of the resulting interstate market in [low-level radioactive] waste dis-
posal is therefore well within Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.").
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the state regulation fails to account for the fact that importation of the
article of commerce at issue, hazardous waste, poses significant long-
term risks to public health and safety within that state. 4 The Court
first concluded that "[t]he Act's additional fee facially discriminates
against hazardous waste generated in States other than Alabama, and
the Act overall has plainly discouraged the full operation of petitioner's
Emelle facility."'" The Court reiterated its long-standing rule that
such discriminatory treatment of out-of-state commerce "is typically
struck down without further inquiry."' 6 Given the discriminatory na-
ture of the additional fee, the Court then articulated Alabama's burden
to demonstrate the fee's permissibility under the Commerce Clause:
"Because the additional fee discriminates both on its face and in practi-
cal effect, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the
local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondis-
criminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at
stake."
17
Accordingly, the Court identified the local purposes purportedly
served by statute, including the protection of the health and safety of
Alabama citizens and the preservation of the State's natural re-
sources.18 Although in the Court's view such local interests "may all
14. Although the Court rejected Alabama's decision to burden only out-of-state
waste with the additional fee, it recognized that the transportation and disposal of haz-
ardous waste do pose risks to Alabama's public health and environment. See 112 S. Ct.
at 2014-15 & nn.6-7.
15. Id. at 2013-14.
16. Id. at 2014. See also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) ("When a state statute directly regulates or discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic inter-
ests over out of state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without
further inquiry."); Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 337 n.14 (1989) (approving
Brown-Forman).
17. 112 S. Ct. at 2014 (internal quotations omitted). Because the Alabama statute's
effects on interstate commerce were not merely incidental, the Court rejected the use of
the less rigorous balancing test articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970). In Pike, the Court considered the effect of a statute which prevented an agricul-
tural producer from sending its crops across state lines for inspection, packing and ship-
ping. Id. at 138-41. The Court stated that, when a "statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. at 142. Instead, the Court in
Chemical Waste Management found that "the Act's additional fee on its face targets
only out-of-state hazardous waste." 112 S. Ct. at 2014 n.5. See infra notes 123-31 and
accompanying text for a critique of the Pike test.
18. 112 S. Ct. at 2014.
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be legitimate," the Court concluded that "only rhetoric, and not expla-
nation, emerges as to why Alabama targets only interstate hazardous
waste to meet these goals."19 In particular, as the state trial court orig-
inally found, Alabama failed to demonstrate that the out-of-state waste
posed any greater danger to Alabama and its citizens than the hazard-
ous waste generated in-state.20
Absent any difference between hazardous waste generated in-state
and that generated out-of-state, the Court determined that "the volume
of waste entering the Emelle facility" was Alabama's fundamental con-
cern." With regard to that concern, the Court found that "[less dis-
criminatory alternatives, however, are available ... not the least of
which are a generally applicable per-ton additional fee on all hazard-
ous waste disposed of within Alabama, or a per-mile tax on all vehicles
transporting hazardous waste across Alabama roads, or an even-
handed cap on the total tonnage landfilled at Emelle, which would cur-
tail volume from all sources."'22 Accordingly, Alabama's additional fee
failed to pass the Court's test for discriminatory regulation of interstate
commerce.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist recalled the themes articulated in
his dissent to the Court's opinion in Philadelphia v. New Jersey.23
There, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Commerce Clause did not
foreclose New Jersey's prohibition against importing most out-of-state
waste. He criticized the majority's reading of the Commerce Clause on
grounds that the Court's reading meant that:
New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations, leaving it-
self to cast about for a presently nonexistent solution to the serious
problem of disposing of the waste generated within its own bor-
ders, or it must accept waste from every portion of the United
States, thereby multiplying the health and safety problems which
would result if it dealt only with such waste generated within the
19. Id.
20. See id. at 2014-15.
21. Id. at 2015.
22. Id. (citations omitted). The Court also stated that:
To the extent Alabama's concern touches environmental conservation and the
health and safety of its citizens, such concern does not vary with the point of origin
of the waste, and it remains within the State's power to monitor and regulate more
closely the transportation and disposal of all hazardous waste within its borders.
Id. at 2015-16.
23. 437 U.S. 617, 629-33 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger
joined the dissent in Philadelphia v. New Jersey. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1993]
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State... [T]he Commerce Clause does not present [the State] with
such a Hobson's choice.... 24
In Chemical Waste Management, the Chief Justice stated this view
even more bluntly:
It increasingly appears that the only avenue by which a State may
avoid the importation of hazardous wastes is to ban such waste
disposal altogether, regardless of the waste's source of origin. I
see little logic in creating, and nothing in the Commerce Clause
that requires us to create, such perverse regulatory incentives.25
As a matter of Commerce Clause doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist
disagrees with the majority view that the Commerce Clause protects
the free movement of waste across state borders. In his view, early
Supreme Court cases established the principle that states may bar the
importation of harmful materials. He supports his position that a state
may bar the disposal of out-of-state waste because of the public health
and safety risks associated with the disposal of such waste with his
reliance on these earlier cases.26
B. A Critique of the Decision
Professor Donald Regan presents a convincing case that the funda-
mental constraint imposed upon the states by the Commerce Clause is
that the states are "prevent[ed] ... from engaging in purposeful eco-
nomic protectionism.... This and no more.",27 Viewed in light of this
central proscription against protectionism, both the majority and dis-
senting decisions in Chemical Waste Management fail to demonstrate
24. Id. at 631.
25. 112 S. Ct. at 2018 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). But see ENSCO, Inc. v. Du-
mas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that federal law preempts a county's
absolute prohibition on the storage, treatment or disposal of "acute hazardous waste"
within its borders to the extent that the prohibition directly conflicts with federal law).
26. The Chief Justice first articulated this position in Philadelphia v. New Jersey.
See 437 U.S. at 631-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1915); Asbell v. Kan-
sas, 209 U.S. 251, 256 (1907); Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 489
(1888); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878)). Chief Justice Rehnquist con-
tinued to adhere to this position in Chemical Waste Management. 112 S. Ct. at 2017-18
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
27. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. Rnv. 1091, 1092 (1986). See also Wyo-
ming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1992) (finding that "when the state statute
amounts to simple economic protectionism, a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity' has
applied.").
PREEMPTING STATE REGULATIONS
either the validity or invalidity of the additional state fee imposed on
the in-state disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste. Rather, both de-
cisions may be fairly criticized because their treatment of Commerce
Clause doctrine is too narrow.
First, it is important to identify why the majority reached the correct
conclusion that the Commerce Clause foreclosed Alabama's imposition
of an additional fee on the disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste.
The Court's conclusion cannot properly be based only on the fact that
such waste is subject to a higher fee than in-state waste. The Com-
merce Clause does not dictate laissez-faire" or even "even-handed" 2 9
state regulation of interstate commerce. Rather, it is important to con-
sider the harms of state protectionist legislation and determine whether
the Alabama statute results in those harms to both commerce and the
relations among the several states.
Professor Regan has identified "three objections to state protection-
ism.",30 In considering the Alabama statute, one objection is foremost
and warrants a conclusion that the law is impermissible. The "concept
of union objection" holds that "[s]tate protectionism... is inconsistent
with the very idea of political union ... .,,31 To understand how the
additional fee undermines the concept of union, one needs to under-
28. See Regan, supra note 27, at 1096 ("Many sorts of regulation are inconsistent
with laissez-faire that are not protectionist .... "); Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 401 (1986) ("[N]o
evidence exists that the [Commerce] Clause was intended of its own force to institute
free trade"); id. at 402 ("The breadth of congressional power [to regulate interstate
commerce] long recognized by the Court seems to be in tension with the view that the
[commerce] clause established free trade as a substantive constitutional goal."). See also
Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 416 (1989) ("mhe Court has emphasized, in the
specific context of applying the dormant Commerce Clause, that the 'Constitution does
not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory.' ").
29. See Regan, supra note 27, at 1116-19 (discussing the permissibility of an Oregon
bottle bill which had the effect of diverting business "from out-of-state bottlers to in-
state bottlers").
30. Regan, supra note 27, at 1112-13. The three objections are the "concept-of-
union" objection, id. at 1113-14, the "resentment/retaliation" objection, id. at 1114-15,
and the "efficiency" objection. Id. at I115-16. For a discussion of the application of
each of these objections to Chemical Waste Management, see infra text accompanying
notes 31-43 ("concept-of-union" objection); notes 44-51 ("efficiency" objection); and
notes 57-63 ("resentment/retaliation" objection). For a discussion of the application of
these objections to Fort Gratiot Landfill, see infra text accompanying notes 88-95 ("con-
cept-of-union" objection); notes 96-100 ("resentment/retaliation" objection); and notes
101-14 ("efficiency" objection).
31. Regan, supra note 27, at 1113.
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stand that the additional fee comprises one of a series of barriers er-
ected by Alabama to counter the effective national response to the need
for cleanup and disposal of hazardous substances. This national re-
sponse admittedly imposes a special burden on Alabama by advocating
disposal of a substantial amount of hazardous waste at the Emelle facil-
ity.32 Alabama has attempted to erect barriers to lessen these burdens
of the national response.
Prior to enacting the additional fee on out-of-state waste, Alabama
enacted a statute forbidding the Emelle facility from importing hazard-
ous waste from any state which failed to meet certain requirements
prescribed by Alabama law. For example, the statute required that the
generating state either enter a waste disposal agreement with Alabama
or have a facility within its borders for the treatment and disposal of
hazardous waste.33 In National Solid Wastes Management v. Alabama
Department of Environmental Management, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the Commerce Clause barred this limitation on the disposal of out-
of-state waste, reasoning that Congress never authorized the selective
ban.34 Indeed, Congress did address the waste-disposal responsibility
of each state that generates hazardous waste. A state must provide the
EPA with adequate assurance that there exists sufficient capacity to
dispose of the hazardous substances that the state will remove when
pursuing CERCLA cleanups.35 The EPA interprets this provision to
allow generating states to demonstrate adequate assurances of disposal
32. For an example of the role that the Emelle, Alabama facility plays under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988), in the cleanup of hazardous substances, see Alabama v.
EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989). In Alabama v. EPA,
the state sought to block the shipment of hazardous substances from a CERCLA site in
Texas to the Emelle facility. Id. at 1551, 1553. Alabama raised both constitutional and
statutory claims challenging the proposed disposal of the hazardous substances in Ala-
bama. Id. at 1554.
33. ALA. CODE § 22-30-11(b) (1990) (referred to as the "Holley Bill"). Gov. Hunt
Announces States that are Prohibited from Shipping Hazardous Waste to Alabama, Press
Release, Aug. 29, 1989, at 2 ("In a press release announcing enactment of the Holley
Bill, Governor Hunt said that Alabama was 'becoming the waste dump of the na-
tion.' "), cited in National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, 910 F.2d 713, 717 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800
(1991).
34. 910 F.2d at 718-22.
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(1988). The statute prevents the EPA from pursuing
remedial actions within the state if a state fails to provide the adequate assurances about
disposal capacity. Id. See also 910 F.2d at 721 & n.11 (construing this provision of
CERCLA).
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capacity by "contract[ing] with a privately owned waste management
facility" in another state.36 The Emelle, Alabama facility is such a dis-
posal site.
In National Solid Wastes Management, the Eleventh Circuit also in-
validated Alabama's land disposal regulations which exceeded the
standards established under the applicable federal regulations.37 The
court concluded that, in enacting the 1984 amendments to the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),3" "Congress ex-
pressly disapproved" any state's "attempt to 'regionalize' pretreatment
requirements.
39
Viewed from this perspective, the additional fee represents another
attempt by Alabama to extricate itself from its role as a principal dispo-
sal site for nationally generated interstate waste." The United States
filed an amicus curiae brief in Chemical Waste Management, which
demonstrates the importance of the Emelle facility. The facility is one
of the very few in the United States permitted to receive and dispose of
the entire range of hazardous waste.41 Therefore, hazardous waste
36. 910 F.2d at 717. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Petitioner at 11, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992)
(No. 91-471) (arguing that the EPA interprets the capacity assurance provision to bar a
State from "ban[ning] the import of waste to the facilities upon which it is relying to
provide its own assurance of capacity.").
37. See 910 F.2d at 722-24 (discussing validity of ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 14-9-.03
(1990)). The court stated that Alabama's "regulations are almost identical to the fed-
eral land disposal ban, except that Alabama did not adopt the EPA's variances from the
effective date of the ban for certain... waste." Id. at 722. The result was that federal
regulations allowed land disposal of certain waste, while Alabama foreclosed land dis-
posal of the same waste. Id. at 724.
38. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat.
3221 (1984) (amending Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976)) (codified as subsequently amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992K (1988)).
39. 910 F.2d at 724.
40. For example, Alabama did not seek to prove that the additional fee was valid as
a proper compensatory tax because the state incurred greater disposal costs as a result
of the out-of-state character of the waste. See Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct.
at 2016 n.9 (declining to consider whether the additional fee is valid as a compensatory
tax because the theory was not the basis for the Alabama Supreme Court's decision and
was neither briefed nor argued by the parties).
41. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1,
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (No. 91-471) (stat-
ing that "the Emelle facility is one of only two facilities east of the Mississippi River
authorized under federal law to dispose of polychlorinated biphenyls" (PCBs)); id. at 7
(reporting that the "Emelle facility is one of a limited number of land disposal sites that
1993]
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sites subject to Superfund cleanups substantially utilize the Emelle fa-
cility.42 As a member of the federal Union, Alabama lacks the power
to undermine unilaterally the national response to hazardous waste
disposal.43
Another of Professor Regan's three objections to protectionism also
leads to condemnation of Alabama's additional fee. The "efficiency"
objection to protectionism,' although not as strong an objection as the
notion of union, is important because it accounts for a critical flaw in
Alabama's regulatory scheme. Professor Regan recognizes that if effi-
ciency is to stand as a fair objection to protectionism, efficiency must
permit state efforts to regulate in a way that internalizes external costs,
such as pollution or litter.45
For a state regulation to avoid characterization as inefficient, and
therefore protectionist, the state must provide a "colorable justification
in terms of a benefit that deserves approval from the point of view of
the nation as a whole."'4 6 For example, in 1971 the State of Oregon
meets the] statutory [technological] requirements" for disposal of wastes that fail to
meet hazardous waste disposal pretreatment standards); see also id. at 8 n. 11 (stating
that "there are currently a small number of large regional hazardous waste disposal
facilities: 35 commercial land disposal facilities in 17 States . . . ."); supra note 11
(noting the national role the Emelle facility plays in disposing of hazardous waste).
42. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1,
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (No. 91-471).
43. Cf. Regan, supra note 27, at 1113. Professor Regan makes the point that:
Protectionism does not merely harm some foreign interests in the process of confer-
ring an independent local benefit. Rather, it takes away from the foreigners in
order to give to local residents exactly what has been taken away.... Such behav-
ior has no place in a genuine political union of any kind.
Id.
44. Id at 1115. Professor Regan describes efficiency as a "treacherous notion,"
which should be applied with care. Id. As the text that follows indicates, Professor
Regan views the efficiency objection as limited to cases where burdens on interstate
commerce cannot be justified on the basis of some colorable, nationally-recognized ob-
jective. Id. at 1118. Cf. Coenen, supra note 28, at 433 (stating that "the Framers'
central goal in forging the Commerce Clause was not to maximize economic efficiency.
Rather, the core goal of the Commerce Clause was and is to engender national solidar-
ity." (footnote omitted)).
45. See Regan, supra note 27, at 1116. Professor Regan also states that:
Part of the point of federalism is to allow states to make their own decisions about
such matters as what sort of an environment they value and want to maintain. So
long as there is no constitutionally stipulated policy against minimizing litter...,
the elimination of litter from Oregon's parks and highways is a good thing from the
federal viewpoint if Oregon says it is.
Id.
46. Id. at 1118. Professor Regan argues that "protectionism is inefficient because it
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enacted a "bottle bill," which imposed a refundable deposit on bever-
age containers and encouraged the use of glass bottles instead of metal
cans.47 The bill favored Oregon bottlers over foreign bottlers because
it increased transportation costs for out-of-state bottlers who had to
transport the heavier containers for longer distances due to the require-
ment that returned containers be transported back for reuse.4" While
the bill did impose these extra costs on out-of-state bottlers, Professor
Regan recognized a "colorable cost-based justification" in that the bill
allowed for internalization of litter costs, which made in-state bottlers
the low-cost producers.49 The Oregon bill thus imposed consistent reg-
ulations on litter and all market participants in seeking to reduce the
externalities associated with the amount of litter within the state.
The same statement cannot be made about Alabama's additional fee.
The Alabama statute was improperly underinclusive because it im-
posed the additional fee only on out-of-state waste. Alabama never
demonstrated that this unequal regulatory burden was required in or-
der to establish an adequate disposal program for the state's own waste.
Chief Justice Rehnquist tried to make this case when he argued that
the additional fee was an effort by the state to internalize certain exter-
nalities,50 but his understanding of the Alabama fee is flawed. The fee
fails to restrict in any way the disposal of hazardous waste by Alabama
citizens while it substantially restricts disposal of out-of-state wastes.
To avoid condemnation as an inefficient, discriminatory regulation, Al-
abama, like Oregon, must demonstrate some basis, other than place of
origin, for imposing different burdens on in-state and out-of-state
waste. Unlike Oregon, Alabama adopted an underinclusive law that
failed to address comprehensively the externalities associated with
waste disposal. Accordingly, Alabama could not present any "colora-
ble justification" for its regulation which, from a national perspective,
deserves approval. 51
Finally, the process-based concerns important to dormant Coin-
diverts business away from presumptively low-cost producers without any colorable jus-
tification in terms of a 'federally cognizable benefit."' Id.
47. Id. at 1102.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1116-18.
50. See Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2018 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing). The Chief Justice argued that the additional fee is a proper tax that "discourag[es]
the consumption of scarce commodities - in this case the safe environment that attends
appropriate disposal of hazardous waste." Id.
51. See supra notes 44-46.
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merce Clause doctrine also support the conclusion that the Commerce
Clause bars Alabama's additional fee. The dormant Commerce Clause
"prevent[s] discrimination against outsiders who are not represented in
the state's political process .... ."' Alabama's additional fee, which
applies only to out-of-state wastes, is objectionable because the political
process which yielded this fee failed to consider the out-of-state inter-
ests or the in-state proxies for those interests.53
Having identified why, contrary to the conclusion of the Chief Jus-
52. Farber, supra note 28, at 396 (footnote omitted); see also Jesse H. Choper, The
Scope of National Power Yrts-a-Vlts the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86
YALE L.J. 1552, 1584-85 (1977). Dean Choper argues that:
[S]tate and local legislatures contain no representatives of the central government
or of those persons outside the jurisdiction upon whom the weight of the local laws
may fall. And since the force of special interest groups is markedly greater in local
legislative bodies than in the federal political process, state and local lawmaking
that affects the federal government or persons engaged in interstate activities may
not be similarly trusted. The phenomenon is most clearly exemplified by laws that
discriminate against outsiders to the benefit of local interests, either private or gov-
ernmental. Moreover, even nondiscriminatory local rules that impose equivalent
burdens on insiders and outsiders may nonetheless fail to express adequate concern
for the broader national interest.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Professor Regan rejects this process-based theory of dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine. See Regan, supra note 27, at 1160-67. This rejection is based, in part, on his view
that such process-based doctrine shifts power away from the legislatures to the courts:
By not requiring state lawmakers to be always looking over their shoulders for
foreign interests and always calculating the proportionate incidence of benefits and
burdens, we make legislation a possible task for lawmakers with less expertise and
less administrative support available to them than Congress has. We also avoid a
massive transfer of power to the courts, federal and state.
Id. at 1165-66.
Notwithstanding Regan's critique, process-based concerns have firm support in
Supreme Court decisions. See, eg., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662, 675 (1981) (plurality opinion) (affirming that whether a state law passes mus-
ter under the Commerce Clause depends in part on whether "a State's own political
process will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations"); Raymond Mo-
tor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (considering whether the "State's own
political processes will act as a check on local regulations that unduly burden interstate
commerce"); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185
n.2 (1938) (noting that "when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls
principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to
those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects ad-
versely some interests within the state."). Indeed, Professor Farber contends that "the
dormant Commerce Clause should be limited to its process rationale." Farber, supra
note 28, at 403.
53. See Farber, supra note 28, at 400-01 ("The process rationale [for the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine] is based on the lack of representation for non-residents in
the political process .... Like racial minorities during much of our history, out-of-state
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tice, Alabama's additional fee was impermissible protectionist legisla-
tion, consider the majority's analysis. The majority premised its
analysis on the relatively insignificant conclusion that the additional fee
discriminates improperly against the movement of out-of-state waste
and failed to confront Chief Justice Rehnquist's core concerns. In his
dissent, the Chief Justice expressed concern that the disposal of out-of-
state waste imposes real and uncompensated risks on the State's envi-
ronment and the health of its citizens.54 Rehnquist argued that the
State may use the additional fee to minimize these risks." The major-
ity responded that Alabama's concerns relate to the volume of waste
and this problem can be addressed by means other than a fee assessed
only against out-of-state waste.
56
The majority's response fails to recognize the existence of certain
unique risks posed by importing and disposing of out-of-state waste.
The unique risks suggest a non-protectionist motive behind Alabama's
regulation. The third of Professor Regan's three objections to protec-
tionist legislation helps in understanding this problem. The "resent-
ment/retaliation" objection5" arises because "protectionist legislation
... is likely to generate a cycle of escalating animosity and isolation
.. , eventually imperiling the political viability of the union itself."5"
However, the threat of "resentment" to the additional fee imposed by
Alabama is insignificant for two reasons. First, at an intuitive level,
citizens of one state are unlikely to believe that they have a right to
dispose of their hazardous waste in another state on the same terms as
citizens of that state, regardless of whether the disposal site is publicly
owned.59 This intuition is based on the citizens' reluctance to allow
residents lack political representation and thus the democratic process may fail fully to
safeguard their interests." (footnote omitted)).
54. Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2017-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2015-16.
57. Regan, supra note 27, at 1114.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1113 (arguing that state legislation is not hostile when "[i]t takes
nothing away from [out-of-staters] that we would normally think they have as much
right to as [in-staters] have."). Chief Justice Rehnquist presents an analogous point in
dissent in Chemical Waste Management:
As the Court acknowledges, [flat, unitary] taxes are a permissible effort to recoup
compensation for the risks imposed on the State. Yet Alabama's general tax reve-
nues presumably already support the State's various inspection and regulatory ef-
forts designed to ensure the Emelle facility's safe operation. Thus, Alabamans will
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any waste disposal site to be located near them." This reluctance leads
to the scarcity of waste sites, which, in turn, exacerbates the current
waste-disposal crisis.61 Citizens of every state come to perceive that
those states willing to incur both the tangible and intangible costs of
operating a hazardous waste disposal facility within their borders are
likely to favor, and properly do favor, their own citizens' use of the
disposal capacity at that facility. Advocates of the "market participant
exception" to the Commerce Clause rely on this perception and
expectation.62
be made to pay twice, once through general taxation and a second time through a
specific disposal fee. Permitting differential taxation would, in part, do no more
than recognize that, having been made to bear all the risks from such hazardous
waste sites, Alabama should not in addition be made to pay more than others in
supporting activities that will help to minimize the risk.
112 S. Ct. at 2018-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
60. See Karen L. Florini, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Control: Cooper-
ation or Confusion?, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 307, 307-08 (1982) (finding that "the
publicity surrounding [incidents involving inadequate disposal of hazardous waste] has
focused public attention on the dangers associated with hazardous waste. As a result,
virtually all recent attempts to site new facilities for treating, storing, or disposing of
such waste have been defeated by opposition from local residents." (footnote omitted));
see also Jonathan R. Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding State
Hazardous Waste Import Bans, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (1990) (discussing a study
showing public opposition to siting of hazardous waste disposal facilities); see generally
Sarah Crim, The NIMBY Syndrome in the 1990s: Where Do You Go After Getting to
'No'?, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 132 (1990) (discussing the problems of siting waste dispo-
sal facilities).
Interestingly, recent studies suggest that hazardous waste facilities present risks of the
same magnitude to the public as solid waste facilities. See infra note 94.
61. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,980 (1991)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) ("Today's disposal capacity crisis is further com-
pounded by the difficulty in siting new solid waste management facilities."); see also
Robert Meltz, State Discrimination Against Imported Solid Waste: Constitutional Road-
blocks, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,383, 10,383 (1990) ("Existing landfills are
rapidly filling up and closing; proposed new ones.., spark intense local opposition.");
James Hinshaw, Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause After Garcia: An Application to
the Interstate Commerce of Sanitary Landfill Space, 67 IND. L.J. 511, 511 (1992) ("Be-
cause sanitary landfill space is rapidly diminishing, it is quickly becoming one of the
United States' most sought after resources.").
62. See Coenen, supra note 28, at 434, where the author states:
If it is 'obvious' that a state may prefer its own residents in distributing its re-
sources, then few nonresidents will take umbrage when a state does so; and if few
nonresidents take umbrage, then their home states are unlikely to pursue the retali-
ations and reprisals the dormant Commerce Clause was meant to neutralize.
Id. (footnote omitted).
For an example of the Supreme Court's application of the market participant excep-
tion, see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 447 (1980) (holding that South Dakota
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The second reason why the resentment/retaliation objection lacks
relevance to the problem of hazardous waste disposal is that retaliatory
action by a state - through the construction of a waste disposal facil-
ity within its own borders and the enactment of a retaliatory limit on
the import of out-of-state waste into that facility - would largely solve
the problem of one state imposing upon another state the risks associ-
ated with disposal of its waste.6 3 Because of the risks associated with
the article of commerce being regulated in the hazardous waste dispo-
sal context and because the state and its citizens receiving the waste
must accept the risks, the resentment/retaliation objection to protec-
tionism has no force in the instant context.
In sum, although the Court properly struck down Alabama's addi-
tional fee on out-of-state waste, the Court's reasoning was too cursory
and therefore failed to recognize the significance of the waste-regula-
tion context. It becomes evident that this cursory decisionmaking re-
sulted in an erroneous decision in the other state waste-regulation case
decided during the October 1991 Term.
II. FORT GRATIOT LANDFILL AND THE DETERMINATION
WHETHER THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ARE
PROTECTIONIST OR ONLY INCIDENTAL
In contrast to Alabama's additional fee, a comprehensive state pro-
gram for the disposal of waste was at issue in the second Commerce
may discriminate in favor of its own citizens in sales of cement from a State-owned
cement plant).
63. Cf. Florini, supra note 60, at 325. The author discusses the reverse commons
problem associated with the siting of waste disposal facilities:
Local groups generally oppose hazardous waste facilities because such facilities
create many costs and few benefits for local communities. Host communities bear
the risks to health and the environment presented by hazardous waste facilities;
whole states and regions, however, share the benefits of having a safe disposal site
for waste produced in creating desirable products. Siting of hazardous waste facili-
ties thus presents a "reverse commons" problem, where the costs of a facility to the
host community outweigh the benefits; as a result, each community refuses to take
action in the hope that if it delays long enough, facilities will be sited in other
communities.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
It is clearly inefficient for each state to establish its own facility, located within its
borders, capable of disposing of a full range of hazardous waste. Given the minimal
quantities of at least some categories of hazardous waste produced in a given state, it is
difficult for that state to justify the cost of a facility capable of disposing of a full range
of hazardous materials. See Crim, supra note 60, at 137 (summarizing a report by the
National Governors Association on state hazardous waste disposal issues).
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Clause case before the Supreme Court last term. Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources 14 involved
a private landfill's challenge to Michigan's Solid Waste Management
Act (SWMA).65 The SWMA established a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for the disposal of solid waste within the state.66 The legisla-
ture amended the SWMA to define the limited circumstances when a
landfill could receive permission to accept solid waste from outside the
county in which the facility was located.67 As amended, the SWMA
established the following Waste Import Restrictions:
A person shall not accept for disposal solid waste.., that is not
generated in the county in which the disposal area is located un-
less the acceptance of solid waste ... that is not generated in the
county is explicitly authorized in the approved county solid waste
management plan.68
In 1987, the petitioner in Fort Gratiot Landfill received a permit to
operate a private landfill in St. Clair County, Michigan.69 In 1989, the
petitioner sought approval of its plan to accept out-of-state waste at the
site.7 ° The operator assured state officials that the facility possessed
sufficient capacity to handle the out-of-state waste and all waste gener-
ated in the county during the next twenty years.71 The county's solid
waste planning committee denied the facility's request to import out-
of-county waste, restricting the facility to the disposal of solid waste
generated within St. Clair County.
72
The landfill operator brought an action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, challenging the constitu-
tionality of Michigan's statute because of the burdens that it imposed
64. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
65. 1978 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 299.401-299.437 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992)
(originally enacted as 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 641).
66. See 112 S. Ct. at 2021-22 (describing the purposes of the SWMA).
67. See 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 475, § 1 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 299.413a, 299.430(2) (West Supp. 1992)).
68. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.413a (West Supp. 1992). See also MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.430(2) (West Supp. 1992) ("In order for a disposal area to
serve the disposal needs of another county, state, or country, the service... must be
explicitly authorized in the approved solid waste management plan of the receiving
county.").
69. 112 S. Ct. at 2022.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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on interstate commerce.73 The district court rejected this Commerce
Clause challenge, holding that the statute did not discriminate on its
face or in its effects.7 4 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Michi-
gan's regulation of solid waste did not violate the Commerce Clause.
The court reasoned that the regulation did not subject out-of-state
waste to more rigorous requirements than those applied to waste gener-
ated within the state but outside St. Clair County, where the landfill is
located."
In Fort Gratiot, the Court considered whether Michigan's regulation
of the disposal of out-of-county waste, including out-of-state waste,
comprised protectionist legislation, subject to the Court's virtually per
se rule of invalidity.76 Justice Stevens, writing for seven members of
the Court, held that "the Waste Import Restrictions [in Michigan's
SWMA] unambiguously discriminate against interstate commerce and
are appropriately characterized as protectionist measures .... ,7 Ac-
cordingly, Michigan faced the same test that applied to Alabama's ad-
ditional fee - "the State bears the burden of proving that the [Waste
Import Restrictions] further health and safety concerns that cannot be
adequately served by nondiscriminatory alternatives. ''78 Michigan's
hazardous waste regulation failed to survive this strict scrutiny test.79
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun,
concluded that the state law was not protectionist, but rather a legiti-
mate state response to legitimate local concerns.80 The state's response
caused only an incidental impact on interstate commerce.81 Justice
73. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 732 F.
Supp. 761, 762 (E.D. Mich. 1990) aff'd, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2019 (1992).
74. 732 F. Supp. at 765-66.
75. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 931
F.2d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
76. Before focusing on this issue, the Court concluded that Michigan's regulation of
solid waste disposal was subject to review under the Commerce Clause because waste
disposal, as well as the commercial transactions associated with it, constitutes interstate
commerce. 112 S. Ct. at 2023-24. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the Court's determinations that waste in various forms is an article of inter-
state commerce.
77. 112 S. Ct. at 2028. Justice Blackmun, who joined the majority in Chemical
Waste Management, dissented with Chief Justice Rehnquist in Fort Gratiot.
78. Id. at 2027.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 2028 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
81. Id.
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Rehnquist would have remanded the case for further proceedings in-
volving a balancing of local interests against the burdens on interstate
commerce.
82
As with its analysis in the Chemical Waste Management decision,83
the Court is superficial in its application of Commerce Clause doctrine.
The Court fails to present a persuasive case that the SWMA is objec-
tionable because it is protectionist. Indeed, the Court offers only one
objection to the legislation - it favors local, in-state waste producers.
84
Before seeking to associate this objection with any of Professor Re-
gan's three core objections to protectionism,85 it is important to recog-
nize that, as an empirical matter, whether Michigan's Waste Import
Restrictions actually favor local waste producers remains unanswered.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the regulation actually increases
the costs of disposal for local waste generators.86 Moreover, recall that
82. Id. The Chief Justice's dissent advocates the use of the balancing test set forth
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See supra note 17 and infra
notes 123-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Pike test). The next part of this
Article advocates the reformulation of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and the
abandonment of the Pike test. Thus, courts would uphold state laws that impose
merely incidental burdens on interstate commerce, assuming they are not protectionist.
83. See supra notes 27-63 and accompanying text.
84. 112 S. Ct. at 2024. The court stated:
The Waste Import Restrictions enacted by Michigan authorize each of its 83 coun-
ties to isolate itself from the national economy. Indeed, unless a county acts affirm-
atively to permit other waste to enter its jurisdiction, the statute affords local waste
producers complete protection from competition from out-of-state producers who seek
to use local waste disposal areas ....
Id. (emphasis added).
85. See supra note 30 for an enumeration of Professor Regan's three core objections
to protectionism.
86. See 112 S. Ct. at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "by limiting
potential disposal volumes for any particular site, various fixed costs will have to be
recovered across smaller volumes, increasing disposal costs per unit for Michigan con-
sumers. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,987.").
This language appears in the preamble to EPA's final regulations prescribing require-
ments for solid waste landfills. The preamble explains the range of incremental costs
associated with the federal regulation of landfills. The EPA states that "[l]andfill size is
a key factor in determining the cost per ton [of disposal], with larger landfills benefitting
significantly from economies of scale." Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed.
Reg. 50,978, 50,987 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 357-58). For private opera-
tors in Michigan to earn a profit, they may have to charge in-county waste generators
increased fees which reflect the costs of complying with the Michigan regulations. Pre-
sumably, landfill owners and operators would raise this argument in seeking permission
for disposal of out-of-county waste. Cf. Crim, supra note 60, at 137 ("[a] state that
refused out-of-state waste at its [publicly-owned] facility probably would need to subsi-
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the Commerce Clause dictates neither laissez-faire nor even-handed
regulation by states.8 7
We now consider whether Michigan's regulatory scheme is objec-
tionable because it is protectionist. The first objection to protectionism
- an objection that applied to Alabama's additional fee88 - is that it
undermines the concept of union.8 9 Professor Regan indicates that it is
not enough to condemn state regulations based on the "concept of
union" objection because the regulation "harm[s] some foreign inter-
ests in the process of conferring an independent local benefit."'  The
regulation must do more if it is to violate the concept of union: it must
"take] away from the foreigners to give to local residents exactly what
has been taken away .... ,91
Does Michigan's regulation work this type of transfer of interests?
The majority does not rely directly on this objection, and the dissent
presents a compelling argument that any such objection to Michigan's
comprehensive regulation of solid waste disposal would be unavailing.
The dissent considers the difficulties encountered by a state that re-
sponds to the waste disposal crisis92 by attempting to ensure adequate
dize the cost of its disposal services in order to attract business from in-state waste
generators.").
87. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application
of the "concept-of-union" analysis to the statute at issue in Chemical Waste
Management.
89. See Regan, supra note 27, at 1113.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. We have already indicated that a solid waste disposal crisis exists. See supra
note 5 (noting that the problem of solid waste disposal has reached crisis proportions).
The EPA indicated that this crisis is likely to worsen in the foreseeable future:
[I]n 1988 the nation generated nearly 180 million tons of municipal solid waste and
that this quantity would likely grow to 216 million tons by the year 2000. This
growing volume of waste is coupled with a steadily decreasing availability of dispo-
sal capacity. In a 1986 EPA survey, 45 percent of the municipal solid waste landfill
owners/operators reported that their landfills would reach capacity by 1991.
Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,980 (1991). In consider-
ing solutions to this crisis, recognize that the responsibility for solid waste disposal,
planning and implementation, including the siting of landfills, lies with the states. See,
e.g., id. at 50,979. The EPA states that:
Subtitle D of RCRA establishes a framework for Federal, State, and local govern-
ment cooperation in controlling the management of nonhazardous solid waste.
The Federal role in this arrangement is to establish the overall regulatory direction
.... The actual planning and direct implementation of solid waste programs
under subtitle D, however, remain largely State and local functions ....
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landfill capacity for its own waste.93
Because its comprehensive regulation of solid waste created some-
thing which would not otherwise have existed - sufficient landfill ca-
pacity for all of the state's solid waste - Michigan should not be
viewed as undermining the concept of union. Sufficient disposal capac-
ity was not taken from out-of-staters, but was established, at no small
risk to the in-state population, through compulsory state regulation.
94
Id. See also Ann R. Mesnikoff, Note, Disposing of the Dormant Commerce Clause Bar-
rier: Keeping Waste at Home, 76 MiNN. L. Rv. 1219, 1221 (1992) ("RCRA created a
comprehensive regulatory system for managing the nation's hazardous waste but left
the responsibility for managing nonhazardous solid waste to state, regional, and local
authorities.").
93. 112 S. Ct. at 2028 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The Chief
Justice pointed out that: "[T]he substantial risks attendant to waste sites make them
extraordinarily unattractive neighbors. The result, of course, is that while many are
willing to generate waste... few are willing to help dispose of it. Those locales that do
provide disposal capacity to serve foreign waste effectively are affording reduced envi-
ronmental and safety risks to the States that will not take charge of their own waste."
Id.
94. Presently, the risks related to solid waste disposal are no less than the risks
associated with hazardous waste disposal. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria,
56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,982 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) ("EPA
agrees with commenters that data available to the Agency at this time do not provide
strong support for distinguishing the health and environmental threats posed by [mu-
nicipal solid waste landfills] and subtitle C [hazardous waste] facilities."). The extent of
the threat to the public health and to the environment posed by solid waste landfills is
reflected by present threats of ground water contamination. See Solid Waste Disposal
Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,319 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-
58) (proposed Aug. 30, 1988) ("More than 500 [municipal solid waste landfills
(MSWLFs)], or about 25 percent of MSWLFs with ground-water monitoring systems,
were reported by States to be violating a State ground-water protection standard,
although the nature and extent of these violations are unknown."). Additionally, the
large number of landfills classified as priorities for Superfund cleanup, indicate ongoing
hazards from solid waste landfills. See id. ("Of the 850 sites listed or proposed for
listing on the [National Priorities List (NPL)] (in May 1986), 184 sites (22 percent)
were identified as MSWLFs. In addition, of the 27,000 sites in the Superfund data base,
almost one fourth are MSWLFs. In general, the MSWLFs on the NPL were poorly
located and designed.").
The EPA has expressed hope and expectations for a substantial decrease in the risks
associated with solid waste disposal. The EPA believes that the risks associated with
solid waste disposal will decrease as a result of new state and local programs. See 56
Fed. Reg. at 50,982 ("[t]he Agency has many reasons to believe that the quality of the
leachate from MSWLFs will improve over time. Increasingly, communities are institut-
ing household hazardous waste programs and removing toxins from waste prior to its
disposal in a municipal landfill."). Also, federal regulation of the design of solid waste
landfills should reduce the risks associated with those facilities. See id. at 50,986 ("EPA
believes that the promulgation of federal municipal solid waste landfill criteria will in-
crease public confidence that landfills are designed to protect human health and the
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As Professor Regan stated, in terms reminiscent of the dissent's argu-
ment, state legislation is not hostile when "[ilt takes nothing away from
[out-of-staters] that we would normally think they have as much right
to as [in-staters] have." 95
environment. EPA believes that this increased confidence will reduce opposition to
landfills and make the siting of new landfills less difficult."); see also 53 Fed. Reg. at
33,321 ("EPA is aware of the crisis in solid waste management and believes that these
proposed Criteria revisions should be a major step toward alleviating public concern
with respect to inadequate controls on solid waste disposal.").
95. Regan, supra note 27, at 1113. See 112 S. Ct. at 2030 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing). The dissent argues that Michigan's regulation is more favorable to out-of-state
waste generators than the Commerce Clause requires:
Michigan has limited the ability of its own population to despoil the environment
and to create health and safety risks by excessive and uncontrolled waste disposal.
It does not thereby violate the Commerce Clause when it seeks to prevent this
resource from being exported - the effect if Michigan is forced to accept foreign
waste in its disposal facilities. Rather, the "resource has some indicia of a good
publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times
of shortage." [Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982)]. Of course the
State may choose not to do this, and in fact, in this case Michigan does permit
counties to decide on an individualized basis whether to accept out-of-county
waste. But such a result is not constitutionally mandated.
Id. See also Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 254 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990), where the Third Circuit compared the siting
of a private landfill within a community to the production of a public good by that
community. Id. The court took
cognizance of the difficulties often attendant in efforts by municipalities to build
waste disposal sites in light of their unpopularity with local residents. Neither the
sacrifice of local residents in allowing a landfill to be built nearby nor the political
character of much of the shortage of land available for landfill construction should
be ignored.
Id.
In attempting to distinguish the regulation at issue in Fort Gratiot from the ban on
out-of-state waste struck down in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, Michigan relied on
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). In Sporhase, the Court struck down a
regulation on interstate groundwater use, but the Court noted that "a state that imposes
severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against
interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of
the state." Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955-56. In Fort Gratiot, Michigan argued that out-of-
state waste could be treated differently because, unlike New Jersey, Michigan took steps
to conserve limited landfill capacity and thereby created a public good. See 112 S. Ct. at
2026. The majority rejected this argument, concluding that Michigan's treatment of
out-of-state waste was unjustified. See id. at 2027. The majority specifically rejected
Michigan's reliance on Sporhase's public-good rationale, finding that the special role of
states relating to groundwater and its quasi-public good character did not apply in the
context of private landfills. Id. at 2027 n.7. The Court stated that "It]here are... no
analogous traditional legal expectations regarding state regulation of private landfills,
which are neither publicly produced nor publicly owned." Id.
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Another of Regan's principal objections to protectionism is that it
causes resentment and a cycle of retaliation by other states.96 The ma-
jority does not rely on this objection to Michigan's Waste Import Re-
strictions either. As in the case of Alabama's additional fee,97 the
resentment and retaliation objection lacks force in the context of Mich-
igan's solid waste regulation. As the dissent in Fort Gratiot argues,
Michigan's regulatory scheme "simply incorporates the common sense
notion that those responsible for a problem should be responsible for its
solution to the degree they are responsible for the problem but not
further."98
Out-of-state citizens and legislators have no reason to resent a state's
controls on hazardous waste disposal when that state imposes the very
same restrictions on its in-state waste producers, all in the interest of
conserving landfill space. As a matter of common sense, both residents
and non-residents perceive the threat that hazardous waste disposal
poses to the nearby environment and the public health. Moreover, be-
cause waste disposal restrictions are a necessity,99 retaliation is unlikely
96. See Regan, supra note 27, at 1114.
97. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the resent-
ment/retaliation objection and its application in Chemical Waste Management.
98. 112 S. Ct. at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Cf. Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v.
Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The residents who reside within
the jurisdiction of a county or municipality are unlikely to pay for local government
services if they must bear the cost but the entire nation may receive the benefit."), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
99. See Swin Resource Sys., Ina, 883 F.2d at 253. The court stated that:
[W]aste disposal is unlike some other natural resource industries in that few com-
munities welcome the opening of a waste disposal site in their midst. The opening
of the site is often viewed as a threat to property values and quality of life that is
acceptable only because of the pressing need for waste disposal.
Id.
Arguably, the new federal standards for solid waste disposal facilities internalize the
negative externalities associated with solid waste disposal. Consequently, the price for
disposing of waste in the future should properly reflect the risks and burdens associated
with disposal of solid waste. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg.
50,978, 50,986 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) ("[T]he final rule [estab-
lishing operating and siting standards for waste disposal facilities], by more fully reflect-
ing the cost of safe waste disposal, will also lead to more responsible waste management
practices and promote resource conservation."). When the externalities cease to exist,
the state where the landfill is located does not assume any burden. Rather, the disposal
facility becomes just another business located in the state.
While there exists some theoretical appeal to this argument, reality is far different.
Communities will continue to oppose state plans to locate landfills nearby, and once a
site is selected, the value of property near the site will continue to be affected. More-
over, it is unlikely that the new federal regulations generate a sufficient level of confi-
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to follow the enactment of a regulatory scheme like Michigan's."°°
Professor Regan's third objection to protectionism is the efficiency
objection, an objection which also applied to Alabama's additional
fee.1 'O The Supreme Court focused on this objection in concluding
that the Michigan Import Restrictions were protectionist, finding that
the restrictions "affordo local waste producers complete protection
from competition from out-of-state producers who seek to use local
waste disposal areas."' 2
Before assessing the efficiency objection, recall Professor Regan's
concern that efficiency is a "treacherous notion."'0 3 Professor Regan
suggests a cautious approach: the Commerce Clause does not con-
demn all inefficient state regulations; rather, it forecloses only those
regulations that penalize commerce outside the state without further-
ing an independent value that is nationally beneficial."°4
Does Michigan's regulatory scheme for solid waste disposal restrain
the disposal of out-of-state waste to enhance such a cognizable interest?
The majority fails to analyze whether there is some permissible basis
for out-of-state waste disposal requirements that are inapplicable to in-
state, and more specifically in-county, waste. The majority's analysis is
also flawed with respect to the efficiency objection because it fails to
account for both the type of commerce being regulated and the fact
that the constraints imposed on out-of-state waste may be central to
the underlying, legitimate purposes of the regulation.
With respect to the type of commerce regulated, the majority deter-
mines, sub silentio, that items of commerce need not be distinguished
for purposes of applying Commerce Clause doctrine. The majority de-
clined to dispute the dissent's statement that disposal of out-of-state
and out-of-county waste imposed negative externalities on the county
where the landfill was located.'0 5 In both its analysis and its conclu-
dence in the safety of landfills to convince state residents to accept such a facility in
their communities.
100. If such retaliation occurred, it would create the solution to the solid waste
disposal crisis discussed at supra notes 5 & 92 because that retaliation would cause
states to ensure sufficient landfill capacity within their jurisdictions. See supra note 63.
101. Regan, supra note 27, at 1115.
102. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024.
103. Regan, supra note 27, at 1115; see also supra note 44.
104. See Regan, supra note 27, at 1118; see generally supra notes 46-49 and accom-
panying text.
105. See 112 S. Ct. at 2028 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("There can be little
doubt that in accepting this garbage, [a private landfill operator] is also imposing envi-
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sion,1°6 the majority ignored the adverse affects associated with import-
ing solid waste, because it equated the regulation of solid waste
disposal with the regulation of the sale of wholesome milk. °7
In assessing the efficiency objection to Michigan's Waste Import Re-
strictions, the majority also failed to recognize the legal significance of
the burden those restrictions imposed on in-state commerce. The ma-
jority relied on previous holdings 08 to support its conclusion that the
ronmental and other risks attendant to the waste's delivery and storage."). One com-
mentator stresses the burdens accepted by any state which receives out-of-state waste
for disposal:
[R]egardless of who operates the disposal facility, it is the residents of the receiving
state who bear the social costs of waste acceptance. These costs include the neces-
sity of increased recycling efforts by local businesses and residents; health risks and
environmental degradation; and eventually a divisive and expensive siting proce-
dure for additional waste disposal facilities. The garbage-receiving state essentially
exports a third benefit by enabling its neighbor to avoid those costs. It can do so
because its residents have worked and will continue to work as a polity to reduce
waste production, save open space for landflling, absorb and mitigate the health
and environmental costs of waste acceptance, and make a hard choice on siting.
David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Com-
merce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1309, 1332-33 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
106. The majority ignored the externalities of waste disposal, holding that "Michi-
gan has not identified any reason, apart from its origin, why solid waste coming from
outside the county should be treated differently from solid waste within the county
." 112 S. Ct. at 2024.
107. The majority viewed Fort Gratiot as legally indistinguishable from Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). See 112 S. Ct. at 2024-25. Dean Milk,
however, involved constraints on the sale of "wholesome milk produced and pasteur-
ized" out of state, 340 U.S. at 354, which lacks the detrimental aspects of solid or
hazardous waste. See infra note 108.
108. Referring to its decisions in Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891), and
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), the Court concluded that "a
State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce
Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the
State, rather than through the State itself." 112 S. Ct. at 2024-25.
Dean Milk is distinguishable from the instant case because Dean Milk involved regu-
lations on the sale of wholesome milk - a product which does not impose negative
externalities on the importing community. See 340 U.S. at 354. The Brimmer Court
concluded that an inspection fee on the sale of meat slaughtered out-of-state bore no
relationship to the state's asserted public health purpose of protecting its citizens from
unwholesome meat. 138 U.S. at 82-84. The locally-produced meat simply was not sub-
ject to the same inspection fee applied to out-of-state meat. Id. The dissent in Fort
Gratiot made this basic point in rejecting the majority's reliance on these decisions:
[I]n both Brimmer and Dean Milk the Court simply rejected the notion that there
could be a noneconomic protectionist reason for the bans at issue, because the ob-
jects being banned presented no health or environmental risk.... Neither Dean
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Commerce Clause precluded burdens on interstate commerce despite a
comparable impact on in-state businesses."' 9
This consideration of the intra-state impacts of the Waste Import
Restrictions is flawed because it fails to recognize, or even to identify,
the interest addressed by the state's regulation in considering whether
the regulation is protectionist. When a regulation burdens both in-
state and out-of-state wastes equally, it is difficult to argue that the
interest being served by the regulation is the significant burdening of
out-of-state waste disposal. Indeed, if Michigan is to ensure adequate
solid waste disposal capacity throughout the state, the difference be-
tween in-county (or in-state-region) and out-of-county (or out-of-state-
region) waste may be critical.11 o The distinction may be necessary for
Milk nor Brimmer prohibits a State from adopting health and safety regulations
that are directed to legitimate local concerns.
112 S. Ct. at 2029-30 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
109. The Court decided that "neither the fact that the Michigan statute purports to
regulate intercounty commerce in waste nor the fact that some Michigan counties ac-
cept out-of-state waste provides an adequate basis for distinguishing this case from Phil-
adelphia v. New Jersey." 112 S. Ct. at 2025-26.
110. The text mentions regional disposal because a state is more likely to succeed in
ensuring sufficient and cost-effective solid waste disposal capacity by requiring different
regions within a state to provide the landfill capacity necessary for proper disposal. By
requiring the siting and development of fewer landfills, this alternative is more likely to
promote sufficiency and efficiency in the use of landfill capacity than Michigan's county-
by-county regulation. The Michigan approach is, however, consistent with the tradi-
tional approach in the United States, which relies on small landfills for the disposal of
most solid waste. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978,
50,988 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) (reporting that "small landfills
(less than 17.5 TPD [tons per day]) represented 51 percent of the total number of land-
fills in 1986, yet handled only 2 percent of the total waste."). Small landfills are gener-
ally poorly designed, located in less environmentally desirable places, and have higher
per ton costs associated with disposal. See id.
EPA has recently identified a "strong trend toward regionalization," stating that:
[S]mall communities have a number of strong incentives to regionalize and, in fact,
many of them have moved or are currently moving to regional facilities. This trend
is evidenced by the drop in landfills over the past twenty years. While 1970 esti-
mates of the U.S. landfill population neared 18,000, EPA estimates that in 1986,
only approximately 6,000 MSWLFs were operating - and that the total number of
landfills continues to decrease.
Id. For an example of a state which pursued a regional approach to ensuring solid
waste disposal capacity within the state, see Industry Assails Pa. Waste-Shed Plan to Bar
Out-of-State Trash, INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT 1 (McGraw-Hill, Inc., New
York, N.Y.) Jan. 22, 1992, at 1 (describing industry criticism of "a recent proposal by
Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey to create four in-state waste sheds, or regions,
each of which would be responsible for the disposal of the solid waste generated within
its own region.").
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the state to succeed in developing sufficient support within affected
populations for the siting of landfills in each county or waste disposal
region throughout the state.
Michigan's SWMA is analogous to the Oregon bottle bill, which
Professor Regan defended as nonprotectionist, because of the nation-
ally-cognizable interest served by the legislation."' 1 In order for the
Bottle Bill to reduce litter effectively within Oregon's borders, the state
imposed general restrictions that impacted both in-state and out-of-
state producers of beverage containers. Any limitation on Oregon's
ability to impose those restrictions on out-of-state producers, because
of concerns about protectionism, would have made the law ineffective
in reducing litter."i 2
The majority's superficial view of protectionism effectively fore-
closed Michigan from enacting comprehensive regulations to ensure
sufficient landfills in each county. Those regulations that rely on the
siting of landfills throughout the state are able to achieve the desired
objective only by curtailing the disposal of all out-of-county waste, re-
gardless of whether it is in-state or out-of-state. Had this case been
remanded for application of the Pike test, which upholds statutes
which regulate evenhandedly to enhance a legitimate local interest un-
less the state imposes clearly excessive burdens on commerce in rela-
tion to the local benefits, 13 Michigan's statutory scheme would have
survived. Michigan could not have accomplished its legitimate interest
without restraints on out-of-state waste and the resulting impact on
interstate commerce. If county residents knew that their local landfill
would be required to accept solid waste from other parts of the state
and from other states, they likely would have opposed siting the facility
in their county.
114
111. See Regan, supra note 27, at 1102-03, 1116-19. See also text accompanying
supra notes 47-50 for a brief explanation of the facts of the "Oregon bottle bill"
legislation.
112. Regan, supra note 27, at 1118.
113. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 177 (1970). See also supra note 17
(discussing the Pike balancing test).
114. Although the majority rejected this argument because "traditional legal expec-
tations" about landfill regulations are unlike expectations related to groundwater, see
112 S. Ct. at 2027 n.7 & supra note 95, the state's actions in developing its scheme for
ensuring adequate solid waste disposal throughout the state make the state a quasi-
market participant in landfill supply. The market participant exception from dormant
Commerce Clause limitations is identified at supra note 62. Although the Court has
repeatedly recognized and applied this exception, see generally Coenen, supra note 28,
at 400-04 (summarizing decisions which have applied the market participant exception),
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Finally, consider Michigan's SWMA in light of the other theoretical
basis for dormant Commerce Clause analysis - the process-based
principle that impacts on out-of-state commercial interests require ju-
dicial scrutiny because the state's political process precludes represen-
tation of these outside interests.115 Michigan relied on this principle to
support its comprehensive waste regulations. In the state's view, the
regulations "do not discriminate against interstate commerce on their
some jurists strongly criticize the exception. See, eg., Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v.
Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 257 (3d Cir. 1989) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting) (charac-
terizing the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause as "a pecu-
liar eruption of Dixieism" and as economically unrealistic); id. at 262 ("The whole
charade of the market participant exception totally unrelated to the regulatory effect of
free markets operating with a profit motive, was never anything but a peculiar manifes-
tation of the 'new federalism' run amok; states rights in drag.").
Analogizing the market participant exception to Michigan's enactment of the
SWMA, the state's legislative action and imposition of mutual burdens within the state
created more of a particular good - available sanitary landfill space. Although state
dollars did not directly purchase the increased supply of this good, as in the market
participant context, the state expended substantial political goodwill to ensure the con-
servation of landfill space and sufficient capacity for each county throughout the state.
Each county had to ensure sufficient capacity within its borders for its own projected
waste levels. See Medical Waste Assocs. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 966 F.2d 148, 151 (4th
Cir. 1992) (relying on market participant exception to support decision that city may
limit a private incinerator to the incineration of local medical waste).
The dissenters in Fort Gratiot made a similar point in chastising the majority for
penalizing Michigan:
The Court today penalizes the State of Michigan for what to all appearances are
its good-faith efforts, in turn encouraging each State to ignore the waste problem in
the hope that another will pick up the slack. The Court's approach fails to recog-
nize that the latter option is one that is quite real and quite attractive for many
States - and becomes even more so when the intermediate option of solving its
own problems, but only its own problems, is eliminated.
112 S. Ct. at 2030-31 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Cf. Florini, supra note 60, at 327
who states that:
The costs of a new facility, including the financial and political costs of dealing
with local opposition, fall primarily on the host state, whereas the benefits of the
facility accrue in part to the several surrounding states.... [S]tates that have too
few hazardous waste facilities lack incentives to participate in the siting process
and thereby to ensure that new facilities are built within their borders. The result
... may be a nationwide shortage of safe [disposal] facilities... and thus a nation-
wide increase in unsafe disposal and illegal dumping.
Id. This view is consistent with Pomper, supra note 105, at 1333, who states that "The
result of this cycle [caused by a failure to allow states to capture for themselves the
benefits of investing in sufficient landfill space] is under-investment in waste reduction
or facility siting, or as is most likely in this politically-charged context, under-invest-
ment in both." Id.
115. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing this theory of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause).
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face or in effect because they treat waste from other Michigan counties
no differently than waste from other States." 11 6 The Court rejected
this argument, stating that "a State (or one of its political subdivisions)
may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the
movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State,
rather than through the State itself." '117
However, the dissent properly identified the process-based implica-
tions of the waste regulations and discussed how those implications
would bolster a conclusion that the regulations are in accordance with
the Commerce Clause. Consistent with Supreme Court precedent,
118
the dissent argued that the adversely affected in-state interests helped
validate the integrity of the political process. These adversely affected
in-state interests ensured that the regulatory scheme was not unduly
onerous. The burden placed on in-state interests provides a representa-
tive or proxy for out-of-state interests that the waste regulations also
adversely impact.1 19
In sum, the majority erred in concluding that Michigan's regulatory
scheme was protectionist and therefore subject to the Court's virtually
per se rule of invalidity. The dissenters properly concluded that the
Waste Import Restrictions were neither protectionist nor the product
of an unfair political process. The dissent also decided, however, that,
116. Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 52 (citing several earlier cases based on the process-based the-
ory of the Commerce Clause).
119. Recognize that burdens imposed within the state itself not only ensure fairer
legislative deliberations within the state, but also serve as independent, effective con-
straints on unduly burdensome state regulations. See Farber, supra note 28, at 413
("[T]he market exacts its own inexorable penalties for needlessly burdensome regula-
tions."). In Fort Gratiot, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained how this balance worked in
Michigan:
By limiting potential disposal volumes for any particular site, various fixed costs
will have to be recovered across smaller volumes, increasing disposal costs per unit
for Michigan consumers. The regulation also will require some Michigan counties
- those that until now have been exporting their waste to other locations in the
State - to confront environmental and other risks that they previously have
avoided. Commerce Clause concerns are at their nadir when a state act works in
this fashion - raising prices for all the State's consumers, and working to the
substantial disadvantage of other segments of the State's population - because in
these circumstances a State's own political processes will serve as a check against
unduly burdensome regulations.
112 S. Ct. at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
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because Michigan's restrictions incidentally affected interstate com-
merce, its regulatory scheme had to be scrutinized under the more per-
missive Pike test.1 20 The dissenters advocated remanding the case to
the district court for application of that test. 21 Although a strong case
exists that the regulation was permitted under the Pike test,122 the next
part of this article argues that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
should be reformed and the Pike test should be abandoned as part of
the transformation of that doctrine.
III. FORT GRATIOT LANDFILL'S FAILURE TO TRANSFORM
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Michigan's system of solid waste regulation was not protectionist
and was therefore consistent with the basic purpose of the Commerce
Clause. The resolution of cases like Fort Gratiot Landfill suggests a
need for greater judicial restraint in invalidating allegedly protectionist
state statutory schemes. However, the Supreme Court appears stead-
fastly wedded to the current dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
That doctrine advocates active judicial review of state laws, even when
those laws have only incidental, nonprotectionist effects on out-of-state
commerce. This doctrine is flawed because it requires federal courts to
assume an improper role within the federal system. The doctrine also
undermines state experimentation while making politically accountable
decisions less likely at the federal level.
A. The Role the Pike Test Assigns to Federal Courts is
Inappropriate
The dissenters in Fort Gratiot Landfill, even after concluding that
Michigan's SWMA was not protectionist legislation, advocated an ap-
plication of the Pike balancing test to determine whether the state law
complied with the Commerce Clause.' 23 Thus, under existing Com-
merce Clause doctrine, even when a law's impact on interstate com-
120. See supra note 17 and accompanying text, and infra notes 123-31 and accom-
panying text for a summary and critique of the Pike test.
121. 112 S. Ct. at 2028 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Because I think the Michigan
statute is at least arguably directed to legitimate local concerns, rather than improper
economic protectionism, I would remand the case for further proceedings."); id. at 2029
("At a minimum, I think the facts just outlined suggest the State must be allowed to
present evidence on the economic, environmental and other effects of its legislation.").
122. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 121.
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merce is incidental and imposes a similar burden on in-state commerce,
the federal courts continue to balance the means and ends of the state's
law. 124
By assigning federal courts the role of evaluating the economic pol-
icy pursued by individual states,1 25 current dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine "[impairs] values of federalism and democratic self-rule."'
126
The doctrine is undemocratic because it places courts in the role of an
unelected legislature which considers the nature of public policy
problems and the appropriate government response. 27 The federalism
implications of the doctrine are no less clear: the federal judiciary as-
sumes the role of testing and resolving the validity of state laws,
124. The Pike test provides that "[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to ef-
fectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.... ." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
125. Farber, supra note 28, at 399.
126. Id. at 414. In objecting to the Pike test, Professor Farber raised several practi-
cal objections. For example, Professor Farber argues that the test unfairly identifies
various factors to be considered by the court, see id. at 398 ("Pike ... establishes a
judicial cost-benefit analysis in which all of the costs of a state law are counted, but only
some of the benefits."), and yields decisions that "are notoriously unpredictable." Id. at
399 (footnote omitted).
Professor Farber also makes an even broader argument that federal courts should be
less intrusive in reviewing state laws when those laws do not purposefully discriminate
against out-of-state commerce. This author believes that the Court correctly decided
Dean Milk, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), because Madison's regulation, which prevented the
sale of wholesome milk produced more than five miles from the center of the city, id. at
350, was properly determined by the Court to be protectionist. Id. at 356. See supra
notes 107-08 and accompanying text for a discussion and analysis of the holding in
Dean Milk. In contrast, Professor Farber believes that the Court incorrectly decided
Dean Milk because of the absence of evidence of purposeful discrimination against the
out-of-state milk producers. In Farber's view, the federal courts should not have closely
scrutinized the regulation at issue in Dean Milk. See Farber, supra note 28, at 406.
There he writes:
In Dean, the existence of discrimination was considered so serious as to create
almost a per se finding of invalidity .... Under the approach suggested in this
section, Dean would be decided differently. In the absence of a finding of intent to
exclude non-residents from the market, the mere existence of an exclusionary effect
would be irrelevant.
Id.
127. See Choper, supra note 52, at 1585-86 ("In [determining whether the chal-
lenged state action unduly imposes upon a delegated but unexercised national power],
the Court performs an essentially legislative role by nakedly constructing policies for
the particular case that are the product of the Court's own balancing of national versus
state concerns.").
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notwithstanding that those laws are not protectionist 128 and that the
judiciary's institutional competency to perform the role is
questionable.
12 9
Even ignoring the federalism and democratic theory problems inher-
ent in the Court's current Commerce Clause doctrine, it is apparent
that that doctrine is counterintuitive when compared to the Court's
equal protection doctrine. As Professor Farber demonstrated:
Under current law, interstate businesses receive far more pro-
tection from state legislation [under the Commerce Clause] than
do racial minorities [under the Equal Protection Clause]. A busi-
ness can establish a prima facie claim under the Commerce Clause
by showing either discriminatory intent, a disparate impact, or a
substantial burden.... [M]inority groups must prove discrimina-
tory intent. 130
In sum, the balancing role performed by the courts under Pike
should be abandoned. Federal courts should not review further non-
protectionist state regulations that have only incidental effects on inter-
state commerce.'
3 '
128. See Farber, supra note 28, at 400 ("The Court's willingness to allow vigorous
judicial supervision of state regulation in Commerce Clause cases seems inconsistent
with its proclaimed attachment to what Justice Black called 'Our Federalism.' ").
129. As discussed previously, the Court is performing an essentially legislative role.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text. In addition, the federal courts have no
special competence in deciding at what level government regulatory initiatives should be
pursued. See Choper, supra note 52, at 1556. Dean Choper states that:
Whatever the judiciary's purported or self-professed special competence in adjudi-
cating disputes over individual rights, when the fundamental constitutional issue
turns on the relative competence of different levels of government to deal with
societal problems, the courts are no more inherently capable of correct judgment
than are the companion federal branches.
Id.
130. Farber, supra note 28, at 403-04.
13 1. Although this author believes federal courts should be less intrusive in review-
ing state laws and regulations that incidentally impact out-of-state commerce, others
argue that courts should continue to pursue active review for structural, institutional or
other reasons. See Choper, supra note 52, at 1586. Dean Choper argues that
"[c]ontinuing judicial oversight of alleged state encroachments on national power" is
proper for two functional reasons: first, Congress lacks sufficient time to review "the
myriad of state and local rules that may arguably intrude on the national domain," and
second, "Congress seems especially unsuited to the task of determining on an ad hoc
basis the compatibility of isolated local ordinances with the broad demands of the fed-
eral system." Id.
See also Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. Rv. 1,
23 (1940). Professor Dowling argues that trial courts, because of their position "on the
front line, where the impact of state action on interstate commerce is first felt," have the
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B. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine Misallocates the Burden of
Changing the Status Quo
We begin this analysis with the premise that we are not concerned
here with limiting activist judicial review of the protectionist rules or
regulations adopted by states or localities, because such rules or regula-
tions are properly subject to review and are foreclosed by the core of
the Commerce Clause. We are concerned here instead with deciding
how or whether the Court should review non-protectionist rules that
nevertheless impose burdens on interstate commerce. The Court's role
in reviewing these state rules is essentially one of statutory construc-
tion, because Congress retains the authority to overrule the Court's
decision and either permit or prohibit the local rules at issue.132 This
potential for congressional legislative action to overrule a court is im-
portant in theory because it defines the Court's task, even though the
act of overruling has very little practical impact: the Court's decision
to strike down a local rule under the Commerce Clause is final in al-
most all cases.
13 3
opportunity to "appraise at close range the conflicting state and national interests," and,
through their "sifting of the facts," are able to "sharpenfl the issues and facilitat[e]
legislative efforts in the event that Congress, dissatisfied with the judicial results, should
desire to take corrective action of its own." Id. See also Hinshaw, supra note 61, at 533
(dormant Commerce Clause doctrine properly "recognizes that because the political
processes do not function effectively when Congress has not acted affirmatively the
courts' continued intervention is necessary to protect the states' interests"). Cf.
Pomper, supra note 105, at 1317 ("[C]ourts should consider whether a Congress fo-
cused on preserving and enriching the political culture of the Union would have author-
ized states to pass the challenged law.").
132. This is also true with regard to purely protectionist legislation. However,
when reviewing local rules of that sort, the Court can be confident that core Commerce
Clause values foreclose local regulation in the absence of congressional approbation.
133. See Choper, supra note 52, at 1586-87.
[I]f the courts were not to continue to review these state and local enactments, the
final weighing of state and national interests would, due to congressional inertia,
effectively rest with state and local lawmaking bodies. On the other hand, despite
the undisputed power of Congress to alter judicial decisions in this area, the same
legislative inertia usually results in the Court's judgment being the last. Given the
unrepresentativeness and parochial perspective of the state and local lawmaking
systems, and the federal judiciary's greater impartiality and sensitivity to federal
needs, the latter is clearly preferable as a final decisionmaker on these questions.
Id. Dean Choper's conclusion that the finality of the Court's decision supports activist
judicial review is arguable. See Coenen, supra note 28, at 438. Professor Coenen argues
that "[b]ecause the dormant Commerce Clause is the dormant Commerce Clause, Con-
gress remains capable of protecting national interests in this area even if the Court holds
back. This consideration.. . provides at best a 'background' justification for judicial
restraint if other factors counsel a cautious approach." (footnote omitted). See also
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In performing the role of interpreting statutes, courts must recognize
the context in which they are acting. 34 In dormant Commerce Clause
cases that do not involve protectionist rules, the critical context is fed-
eralism. Specifically, federalism provides states the freedom to experi-
ment in developing effective governmental responses to grave public
policy issues.13 5 Indeed, the role of the states in formulating public
policy responses to the waste disposal crisis is particularly important
because EPA, interpreting RCRA, places prime responsibility on the
states to design and implement programs that ensure adequate disposal
capacity at an affordable price.1 36 In the context of waste disposal,
Pomper, supra note 105, at 1322 ("[TIhe federal government's broad power to preempt
state decisions argues for granting states more, not less, leeway to legislate in the first
instance." (footnote omitted)).
134. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 808 (1983) ("[lIt is impossible to make sense of
statutory language without some context."); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on
the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195,
199 (1983) (suggesting that a court "ignores reality" if, in interpreting a statute, it stops
at the words of the statute and fails to consider their context).
135. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."); Coenen, supra note 28,
at 429-30 ("[Two key goals of our constitutional federalism" are "the encouragement
of novel state experiments and the fostering of governmental responsiveness to distinc-
tive local needs."); Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019,
1034 (1977) ("No-fault insurance is a sufficient example [of the benefits of state experi-
mentation]; we may end up with a uniform federal system or minimum federal stan-
dards, but we should never have had anything save for experimentation by the states.").
Cf. Pomper, supra note 105, at 1334-35 ("[W]aste disposal and processing is an area in
which experimentation by the states is devoutly to be wished. Recycling, in particular,
involves invention and the development of new institutions." (footnote omitted)). But
see Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Cr. REv. 341, 408 ("The importance attached by many to the
states' function as laboratories of experiment is at least in part exaggerated and, in any
case, of little significance for constitutional adjudication.").
136. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,980(1991).
In EPA's view a state's ability to ensure affordable waste disposal may necessitate reli-
ance on larger, regional landfills to which local waste may be transported. Id. The
regulations state:
EPA encourages owners/operators to employ their knowledge of the universe of
solid waste management options... when evaluating the merits of available practi-
cable alternatives .... As an example, owners/operators might want to consider
how much a community must increase its percentage of total budget spent on solid
waste disposal to cover costs for waste hauling to a regional facility.
Id. at 50,991. See also id. ("Small communities .... whose small landfills do not qualify
for a waiver under today's rule should consider regionalization to mitigate costs. Due
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courts need not concern themselves with the harmful impact of state
experimentation on public health and the environment either within or
outside the state. This is because under RCRA, EPA prescribed mini-
mum standards for waste disposal facilities.' 37 The EPA regulations
prevent states from debasing those minimum standards and engaging
in a "competition in laxity," by seeking waste disposal business at a
discount price.138 In sum, there is no need for an activist dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the context of waste disposal. Such
jurisprudence is in fact damaging because it limits opportunities for
state experimentation in responding to an important public policy
problem that has significant local effects.
139
Instead of pursuing its activist approach to nonprotectionist legisla-
tion, the Supreme Court should use its doctrine to reinforce creative
federalism, as well as congressional supremacy in the public policy and
legislative arenas. Indeed, considering that dormant Commerce Clause
to economies of scale, small landfills operate at a higher cost per ton than larger, re-
gional facilities."). However, this view of the importance of large regional landfills does
not suggest that EPA premises its conception of solid waste disposal on the free move-
ment of the waste across state borders. The regional landfills that EPA believes are
necessary to reduce disposal costs may be located in the same state as a locality which
produces insufficient volumes of waste to warrant construction of its own landfill.
137. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. at 50,978, 50,982
(1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58).
138. See Harry N. Scheiber, State Law and "Industrial Policy" in American Devel-
opment, 1790-1987, 75 CAL. L. REv. 415, 436 (1987). Scheiber points out that:
Uniform minimum standards save [states] from the baneful effects of 'competition
in laxity' and debasement of standards. Alternatively, a mandated national stan-
dard pulls the rug out from under the states that would lower the level of public
goods and services they provide to their citizens in the quest for presumed short-
term or even long-term advantage.
Id.
139. Activist review and overruling of nonprotectionist state and local laws discour-
ages experimentation. Certain laws, such as Michigan's SWMA, are precluded, and, for
those states that still wish to experiment, the costs of experimentation increase. See
Coenen, supra note 28, at 429. Coenen defends the market participant exception to the
Commerce Clause because "[i]f the state must pay the 'added price' of including nonres-
idents when it directs resources into the marketplace, the state will be encouraged to
adopt non-marketplace programs not producing the greatest benefit for state residents."
See also Hinshaw, supra note 61, at 537 n.140, who states:
[[]f a state cannot retain for its citizens the benefits of its own experimentation
(through recognition of some sort of constitutionally enforced property right), the
state will not spend as much of its resources on such projects. Because of this
classic 'free rider problem,' states will not experiment and develop solutions to the
nation's problems without some sort of incentive ... 
Id.
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doctrine effectively determines which side must bear the burden of na-
tional political inertia, the importance of the Court's role comes into
even sharper focus." 4 Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine should
foreclose judicial overruling of nonprotectionist local regulations, in
part because greater judicial restraint encourages legislative or other
political14" ' action. Judicial restraint also avoids the problem of dis-
couraging political decisionmaking at the federal level. 142
140. See Farber, supra note 28, at 412 ("Since Congress can correct judicial mis-
takes, what is ultimately at stake under the dormant Commerce Clause is the burden of
inertia. Should the states or interstate businesses have the burden of getting congres-
sional action?"). Although the status quo may directly threaten the interests of some
states, there is no assurance that such circumstances will result in congressional action.
Professor Scheiber lauds examples of "the states' successful coalition-building, both
during the 1981-83 crisis of threatened 'swaps' and 'turnbacks' of functions to the states
and during the tax-revision debate of 1986 to protect their common institutional inter-
ests," which he views as "bear[ing] out Madison's prediction in The Federalist No. 46 -
that 'ambitious encroachments' by the national government on state authority would be
perceived by the states as a common threat." Scheiber, supra note 138, at 438 (quoting
THE FEDERALST No. 46, at 320 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
Although interstate coalitions may provide sufficient impetus to change the status quo
in unusual circumstances, such a coalition is unlikely when the status quo benefits cer-
tain states at the expense of others.
141. Congress need not make all politically accountable decisions. Federal adminis-
trative agencies, with their substantive expertise and ability to gather information, also
may review state laws impacting interstate commerce. See Farber, supra note 28, at
407. Compared to activist judicial review, agency review is "relatively [more] accounta-
ble to the political process" and has "the advantage of an express legislative mandate."
Id. at 408; see id. at 409 ("When Congress has delegated its policymaking role to an
administrative agency, that agency should be trusted to decide whether a state law is
inconsistent with the national interest."); see also Choper, supra note 52, at 1587 n.194
(suggesting that, in lieu of decisionmaking by federal courts in dormant Commerce
Clause cases, a federal administrative agency could be established to "enact general
rules and regulations, as well as adjudicate particular cases. An agency would presuma-
bly possess greater expertise" and be more responsive to the "spoken and unvoiced
thinking of Congress" because of its political nature.). But cf. Hazardous Waste Treat-
ment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 793 (4th Cir. 1991) ("EPA may deserve
deference in its construction of its own regulations but it does not necessarily deserve
deference with respect to whether Congress authorized it to permit states to violate the
Commerce Clause.").
142. Dean Wellington and Professor Bickel suggest that a court's interpretation of a
statute should promote a political decision on a pressing matter of public policy, rather
than effectively foreclose legislative action on the public policy question. See Alexander
M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 17 (1957) (arguing that in all statutory cases
"Congress can have the last word if it chooses. [However, t]here are times when as a
practical matter Congress may be able to act if the court does one thing but not if it does
another."). The authors use Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946), to demon-
strate how a court may interpret a statute in a way that limits congressional action to
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A reformulated doctrine has these beneficial effects, because, when
local regulations are permitted, two motivations for congressional ac-
tion exist, as opposed to the one motivation that is present when the
federal judiciary proscribes the regulation. Specifically, both the un-
derlying public policy problem that a local regulation addresses and
the impact of the local regulation may motivate congressional action
when state regulation is permitted. When state regulation is fore-
closed, it cannot impact congressional action. The nature of the local
regulation, if permitted following review under the Commerce Clause,
is likely to affect both the timing and the character of any corrective
action by Congress. A reformulated, less-activist doctrine reinforces
the virtues of federalism by allowing state experiments to continue.
Similarly, a less activist doctrine reinforces the virtues of legislative
supremacy by allowing Congress to investigate and account for the re-
sults of local regulation when it determines that federal action is
needed. 143
In sum, the Court should encourage congressional action, while per-
mitting states to implement their own solutions, provided that they are
not protectionist. The core of this reformulated dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, restated as a clear-statement rule, is: Unless state leg-
islation is protectionist, and thus plainly inconsistent with Commerce
Clause values, the Court, in recognition of the values of federalism and
political decisionmaking, will refrain from overruling state and local
regulations that incidentally burden out-of-state commere1 44
overrule the interpretation. The issue in Cleveland was whether the Mann Act forbade
interstate transportation of a woman for purposes of polygamy. Id. at 16. The Court
found no evidence of congressional intent to limit the Mann Act's application to "com-
mercialized sexual vice" and therefore held that the Act applied to polygamy. Id. at 19.
Professor Bickel and Dean Wellington suggested that the Court reached the wrong con-
clusion because "the only way to leave the last word to Congress was to hold the Act
inapplicable to polygamy, enabling Congress either to acquiesce or respond in a manner
reasonably open to it." Bickel & Wellington, supra note 141, at 17 n.67.
143. See Pomper, supra note 105, at 1315 n.34. A less activist doctrine is also pref-
erable because it removes federal courts from the inappropriate role of balancing the
means and ends of state regulations. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the current role of the judiciary in evaluating regulations under the
dormant Commerce Clause.
144. Professor Farber reaches a similar conclusion about the implications of the fact
that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has the effect of determining the party that
must bear the burden of changing the status quo. He states that:
In allocating th[e] burden [of gaining congressional action], it is useful to consider
which party is more likely to get judicial mistakes corrected. The very reason for
giving the power to regulate interstate commerce to Congress, rather than to state
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IV. STATE REGULATION OF WASTE DISPOSAL AFTER THE 1991
TERM: SURVEYING A NARROWED RANGE OF OPTIONS
The Court's application of a flawed interpretation of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine compels states to modify their regulation of
waste disposal, if they wish to limit out-of-state waste disposal, without
violating the dormant Commerce Clause.14 5 Consider the remaining
options for solid waste and hazardous waste regulation.
1 46
A. Permissible State Regulation of Solid Waste Disposal
1. Public Operation of Waste Disposal Facilities
For states or localities wishing to limit or bar the disposal of out-of-
state waste, the most likely alternative is to pursue public ownership
and operation of the disposal facility. This is the most likely alterna-
tive because public operation of landfills is common in the United
legislatures, is that Congress is more responsive to the national interest and less
responsive to parochial interests. If so, those claiming to represent the national
interest should be better able to secure congressional action than their opponents.
Hence, the burden of overcoming congressional inertia should be on them.
Farber, supra note 28, at 412 (footnote omitted).
Another argument in favor of a less activist dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
follows from the burden that results from an erroneous decision by an unelected judici-
ary. Dean Choper thus states that because the Court's decision in a dormant Com-
merce Clause case is final:
[J]udicial error in engaging in its legislative-like balance of the nation's needs
against local efforts to deal with pressing problems has significant conse-
quences.... [I]f the Court inflates the strength of the national interest in uniform
regulation (or nonregulation) and invalidates the state or local law before it, the
result is politically unintended federal protection for those persons subject to the
challenged ordinance. This immunity from needed and useful local regulation will
likely be permanent ... despite the fact that Congress may wholly approve of the
state action....
Choper, supra note 52, at 1587 n.194. This acknowledged danger of activist jurispru-
dence further supports the argument for restrained application of the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine.
145. In the event that states wish to treat in-state and out-of-state waste the same,
the Supreme Court in Chemical Waste Management identified several even-handed reg-
ulations that allow states to accomplish different goals. See 112 S. Ct. at 2015 (quoted
supra at text accompanying note 22).
146. These basic options are well recognized. See Hinshaw, supra note 61, at 513
("The three most prominent methods developed for preserving landfill space involve,
either independently or in combination, (1) recycling and resource recovery programs;
(2) state control of landfill services; and (3) regulations which explicitly discriminate
against out-of-state interests." (footnote omitted)). The two Supreme Court decisions
that are the subject of this article foreclose the third option.
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States. 147 Under current dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, a state
or locality that owns and operates a waste facility is a market partici-
pant14 8 and thus exempt from the limitations that the Commerce
Clause would otherwise impose. 149 The Fort Gratiot Court did not de-
cide "any question concerning policies that municipalities or other gov-
ernmental agencies may pursue in the management of publicly owned
facilities."
150
Two important and related factors constrain the ability and willing-
ness of states and localities to pursue this option. First, states and lo-
calities already face substantial budget shortfalls. Therefore, they are
likely to resist public projects requiring expenditures of funds.151 Sec-
ond, as a result of new mandatory federal standards for landfills, per-
ton costs of operating a landfill are likely to increase substantially, par-
147. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,318 (1988)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) (proposed Aug. 30, 1988), which states that,
"[a]ccording to the State Census, [municipal solid waste landfills] . . . are owned
predominantly by local governments (80%), with the remainder owned by private enti-
ties (15%), the Federal Government (4%), and State governments (1%)." Id.
148. The market participant exception is discussed at supra notes 62 and 114.
149. See Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 249 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990). The Third Circuit held that dormant Com-
merce Clause restraints do not apply to either a public landfill or the restrictions im-
posed on the disposal of out-of-county waste within that landfill. Id. The county is a
market participant, rather than a market regulator; therefore, the dormant Commerce
Clause is inapplicable. Id. The court stated that, "[i]f a city may constitutionally limit
its trucks to collecting garbage generated by city residents, we see no constitutional
reason why a city cannot also limit a city-operated dump to garbage generated by city
residents." Id. at 251. See also Pomper, supra note 105, at 1337 ("When the state not
only absorbs the social costs of a landfill but also owns the land and operates the land-
fill, it should be allowed to withhold landfill space entirely from residents of other
states."); accord, Hinshaw, supra note 61, at 535-36 (finding that states should retain
the benefits of the public funds they spend).
The Swin Resource court also rejected an argument that the county could not limit
disposal of out-of-county waste because the Commerce Clause foreclosed such hoarding
of a scarce natural resource. See 883 F.2d at 251-54. The court concluded that such an
exception was inapplicable for several reasons, including the fact that "land, the natural
resource at issue here, cannot be used for a landfill without the expenditure of at least
some money to prepare it for that purpose. The Lycoming landfill is therefore 'not
simply happenstance."' Id. at 252.
150. 112 S. Ct. at 2023 (emphasis added).
151. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. at 50,980 (1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) ("The municipal solid waste crisis comes at a time
when local governments and Indian Tribes are faced with a wide range of competing
demands for their limited financial and technical resources.").
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ticularly for low-volume landfills that serve smaller communities.152
Indeed, these increased operating costs may force some smaller public
landfills to cease operations. 153 Therefore, state ownership of a re-
gional landfill facility that serves a larger region of the state is a poten-
tially useful scenario.
15 4
2. Defining a Reason for Differential Treatment of Out-Of-State
Waste That Would Be Acceptable Under Current
Commerce Clause Doctrine
If a state decides not to pursue public operation of landfills, the state
may nevertheless limit the disposal of out-of-state waste, assuming it is
able to identify some permissible reason for treating the out-of-state
waste differently.' 55 The greatest opportunity for pursuing such a
strategy is to require reductions in the sources of waste through a sys-
tem of compulsory recycling. As the composition of solid waste dis-
posed of throughout the country indicates,156 local recycling has the
potential to reduce dramatically the volume of solid waste. 157 A state
152. The cost impact of the new federal standards on low-volume landfills is dis-
cussed at supra note 136.
153. The study that EPA relied on in supra note 147 to show that local govern-
ments own 80% of all landfills in the United States, also shows that many existing and,
by inference, public landfills lack proper structural controls to ensure protection of pub-
lic health and the environment. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed.
Reg. 33,314, 33,318-19 ("According to the State Census,... only 15 percent [of munici-
pal solid waste landfills] are designed with liners (natural or synthetic) and only 5 per-
cent have leachate collection systems. Current data also indicate that only 25 to 30
percent of MSWLFs have some type of ground-water monitoring system ... ."). Id.
Once these inadequate public landfills, many of which are also small volume landfills,
see supra note 110, are required to install new mandatory controls, states and localities
may decide to close the landfills because the new requirements are too costly.
154. The potential benefits of a regional approach to solid waste disposal are dis-
cussed at supra note 110.
155. The Court in Fort Gratiot stated that "our conclusion would be different if the
imported waste raised health or other concerns not presented by Michigan waste." 112
S. Ct. at 2027.
156. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,318 (1988)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) (proposed Aug. 30, 1988). An EPA study found that:
[Oin average, more than 50 percent of municipal solid waste comprises paper, pa-
perboard, and yard waste; nearly 40 percent is metals, food waste, and plastics; and
the remaining 10 percent is wood, rubber, leather, textiles, and miscellaneous inor-
ganics. Waste composition was found to be highly site-dependent and influenced
significantly by climate, season, and socioeconomic factors.
Id.
157. Source reduction does not necessarily require a recycling program. It could
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may establish even stronger grounds for differential treatment of out-
of-state waste, if it pursues a coordinated recycling program that
removes toxic materials from the municipal solid waste stream. How-
ever, state implementation of source reduction programs, like public
operation of landfills, is costly.158 A state will be far less willing to
incur these expenses if the dormant Commerce Clause compels the
state to transfer the conserved landfill space to unregulated and there-
fore inefficient, voluminous, out-of-state waste.159
There are three reasons why a state's use of source reduction
through compulsory recycling should permit that state, consistent with
the Commerce Clause, to bar out-of-state waste that are not subject to
the same source reduction requirements. First, the state would prop-
erly be treating such out-of-state waste differently because those wastes
use a commodity, conserved landfill capacity, that a state created
through self-imposed thrift." °
Second, when implemented as part of a comprehensive source reduc-
tion and recycling program, a state's limitations on disposal of out-of-
also be achieved through the use of "economic incentives, including volume-based pric-
ig schemes, to promote increased source reduction." Solid Waste Disposal Facility
Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,981 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58).
Under current dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, such economic incentives, if pur-
sued as the only way to achieve source reduction, must be applied to out-of-state waste
on a nondiscriminatory basis.
158. See Pomper, supra note 105, at 1332 n.129 ('The leading legislative proposals
to increase recycling are expensive; they are economical only because their costs are
offset by disposal cost savings.") In the future, the expense of source reduction and
recycling is less likely to discourage state programs because the new federal standards
will increase disposal costs. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. at
50,978, 50,988 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) ("[Today's rule, by call-
ing for communities, including public and private entities, to pay the true cost of safe
landfilUing, makes source reduction and recycling programs more competitive.").
159. See supra note 139 for a discussion of why state experimentation in costly solu-
tions to public policy problems is less likely when the state cannot enjoy the benefits of
its investment.
160. See Hinshaw, supra note 61, at 542, where the author discusses "state-enacted
recycling and resource recovery programs," which "might require all landfills to accept
solid waste that has first been separated as 'true waste' through an effective recycling
program." Such a program results in the "creat[ion] ... of landfill capacity." Id. at
543. A sufficiently rigorous recycling program equates the state's reasons for limiting
disposal of out-of-state waste to the reasons for limiting out-of-state use of ground
water, which the Court concluded were proper in Sporhase. 458 U.S. 941, 956-57
(1982). See also supra note 95 (discussing Sporhase); Pomper, supra note 104, at 1331
(arguing that a "thrift exception" may properly be applied "when the state, in order to
encourage conservation, has purposefully encouraged or coerced its residents into
changing their practices from some preexisting or national norm.").
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state waste is consistent with the Commerce Clause because out-of-
state waste pose proportionately greater health and safety risks, due to
their volume and toxicity. These important differences in the inherent
characteristics of the waste make the out-of-state waste the proper sub-
ject of a state quarantine on importation. In Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, the Court specifically rejected Alabama's argument that its
additional fee was a constitutional quarantine against out-of-state haz-
ardous waste, because "the additional fee applies only to interstate haz-
ardous waste, but at all points from its entrance into Alabama until it is
landfilled... , every concern related to quarantine applies perforce to
local hazardous waste, which pays no additional fee."' 61 Alabama's
failure to demonstrate that the out-of-state waste presented a greater
threat to the state's public health and environment invalidated the
states' efforts to quarantine that waste. A source reduction and re-
cycling program provides strong grounds for imposing such a
quarantine.
Finally, a state's effort to pursue source reduction and recycling is
likely to survive a Commerce Clause challenge levied against state ef-
forts to ban the disposal of out-of-state waste, because the state's efforts
to reduce the volume of waste promotes federal solid waste disposal
policies. 161 Unless Congress and the courts permit states to retain for
themselves the benefits of their investment in source reduction and re-
cycling, states will be far less willing to pursue this strategy. Absent
some incentive for states to reduce the volume of waste, the federal
policy will be undermined. Although this last reason, standing alone,
is insufficient to warrant a conclusion that the limits on out-of-state
161. 112 S. Ct. at 2017. Alabama sought to rely on the Court's decision in Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). There, the Court applied the quarantine doctrine to up-
hold Maine's prohibition against the importation of out-of-state baitfish. Id. at 151.
The Court upheld that limit on out-of-state commerce because the baitfish "were subject
to parasites foreign to in-state baitfish," and their importation threatened the state's
own baitfish industry. 112 S. Ct. at 2017 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 140). The
Chemical Waste Management Court concluded that the reasoning in Maine v. Taylor
was inapposite in considering Alabama's additional fee because the out-of-state hazard-
ous waste "is the same regardless of its point of origin." 112 S. Ct. at 2017.
162. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. at 50,978, 50,980
(1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58). The regulation provides that "the strat-
egy [for addressing the municipal solid waste management problems] strongly encour-
ages the use of source reduction (i.e., reduction of the quantity and toxicity of materials
and products entering the solid waste stream) followed by recycling as first steps in a
solid waste management system." Id. See also id. at 50,981 ("The highest priority in
EPA's strategy for addressing the nation's solid waste problems is increasing source
reduction.").
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commerce are proper, it is a sound argument in support of more sensi-
tive review by federal courts of the state's laudable program to reduce
waste.
B. Permissible State Regulation of Hazardous Waste Disposal
The same basic options and arguments apply to state efforts to limit
or bar disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste. 63 Consider the extent
to which the hazardous waste context affects those options.
The market participant exception is likely less attractive to states
when it is presented in the hazardous waste context. The costs associ-
ated with administering a hazardous waste disposal facility are much
higher than the costs of a solid waste facility. 1 4 Many states simply do
not produce sufficient amounts of hazardous waste to permit cost-effec-
tive operation of a comprehensive disposal facility that accepts only in-
state waste. 16' Even if these direct costs were not sufficient to discour-
age a state's market participation, few states would welcome the polit-
ical firestorm that would follow the announcement of plans to site a
major hazardous waste disposal facility within its borders, even if the
facility were open only to in-state waste.
163. In his dissent in Chemical Waste Management, Chief Justice Rehnquist also
suggests that states may accomplish the desired effect of limiting out-of-state waste dis-
posal through the use of state subsidies to producers of hazardous waste. See 112 S. Ct.
at 2019 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Presumably, the state would then apply a uni-
formly high fee for the disposal of any hazardous waste within the state. However, such
a program involves substantial administrative costs to prevent fraud through the coun-
terfeiting and dilution of waste. See Clifford S. Russell, Economic Incentives in the
Management of Hazardous Waste, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 257, 266-67 (1988) (dis-
cussing the practical and theoretical difficulties of administering an economic incentive
system for managing hazardous waste).
If a state wishes to foreclose entirely the disposal of any hazardous waste within its
borders, it may wish to impose environmental requirements that exceed the federal stan-
dards for disposal facilities. Such stringent environmental requirements might effec-
tively preclude operation of a disposal site within that state. See North Carolina Law No
Reason to Revoke RCRA Authority, EPA Administrative Judge Rules, 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1979 (1990) (discussing permissibility of a state water quality law that blocked
operation of a commercial hazardous waste treatment facility). The permissibility of
this strategy, which turns on questions of federal preemption, is beyond the scope of this
article.
164. See Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 50,986-87
(1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257-58) (enumerating and comparing costs for
various types of waste disposal).
165. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 8 &
n.ll, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (No. 91-471).
See also supra note 63.
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With regard to the second option available to states - defining some
permissible basis for regulating the disposal of out-of-state waste more
stringently than in-state waste - the hazardous waste context is also
likely to constrain the state's options. States likely lack the resources
necessary to develop a recycling program that treats hazardous waste
as comprehensively as a recycling and source reduction program treats
solid waste. Even if a state wished to pursue recycling and source re-
duction of hazardous waste, including, for example, a deposit-refund
system, 166 the state would likely differentiate between various catego-
ries of hazardous waste in deciding whether source reduction was eco-
nomically and practically feasible and in determining the type of
recycling to pursue. 167 The result would be that, even if a state adopts
recycling, the state will not have sufficient grounds for barring disposal
of all out-of-state hazardous wastes within the state. Commerce Clause
doctrine allows the state to bar disposal of only the types of hazardous
waste that are subject to an appropriate recycling program.
In sum, although the Court's dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
does not absolutely foreclose state limits on the disposal of out-of-state
waste, states are unlikely to develop permissible limitations when the
waste at issue is hazardous. States must await congressional action
sanctioning limits on the disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste.
168
CONCLUSION
In the almost fifteen years since Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the na-
tion's waste disposal crisis has worsened. In its first decisions consider-
ing state regulation of waste disposal since that case, the Court failed in
two ways. First, the Court rigidly and superficially applied its dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine in the waste disposal context. As a result,
the Court failed to account for the legitimate local needs and unavaila-
bility of less discriminatory alternatives, when it struck down Michi-
gan's SWMA.
Second, the Court failed to take advantage of an opportunity to
transform its dormant Commerce Clause doctrine both to relieve fed-
166. See Russell, supra note 163, at 267-69.
167. See id. at 271-72.
168. Cf. Florini, supra note 60, at 337 ("Congress should amend RCRA to en-
courage states to enter interstate compacts governing hazardous waste facilities. Such
legislation would give states an incentive to expedite the siting of additional facilities
and would address the reverse commons problem without relying on the market partici-
pant doctrine.").
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eral courts of their improper role in evaluating the propriety of nonpro-
tectionist state laws and to encourage political decisionmaking at the
federal level to address an important public policy problem. The result
is that states have a more limited range of options available to ensure,
in a politically and financially feasible way, sufficient capacity to dis-
pose of the solid and hazardous waste that their citizens produce.
